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Federalism Issues in "No Airbag" Tort Claims:
Preemption and Reciprocal Comity
Timothy Wilton*
Airbags' have probably received more attention in recent years
than any other single device for motor vehicle safety.2 The United
States Department of Transportation has promulgated, modified,
revoked, and reinstated various Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Stan-
dards (FMVSS) concerning airbags.3 Congress, 4 the Executive, 5
and federal courts, 6 including the United States Supreme Court,7
have considered and taken action on various aspects of the question
of automotive passenger restraint, including airbags. The result of
all this attention is FMVSS 208,8 which governs "Occupant Crash
Protection" by "specifying equipment requirements for active and
passive restraint systems."
FMVSS 208 has never required airbags to be installed, but in-
stead has allowed the manufacturer to satisfy the standard by use of
a variety of types of seatbelts. The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), the branch of the United States Depart-
ment of Transportation responsible for FMVSS, has repeatedly
been urged to require installation of airbags. Until recently,
NHTSA has generally favored passive restraints in theory, but has
consistently refused to mandate the actual installation of airbags.
In reaching its most recent decision on the airbag issue, NHTSA
engaged in "a thorough review of the issue of automobile occupant
protection," 10 considering nearly 8,000 public comments, testi-
mony from 152 hearing participants, and the results and analyses of
extensive studies from technical and social perspectives.11 NHTSA
* Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A., 1968,J.D., 1971,
LL.M., 1977, Harvard University.
I While this article focuses on airbags, the points it raises are equally applicable to
other passive restraint devices such as automatic seatbelts.
2 See Hricko, T.J Hooper and the Air Bag, 27 FEDERATION OF INS. COUNS. Q. 233 (1977).
3 See text accompanying notes 24-49 infra.
4 See note 30 infra.
5 See Nader v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (denying injunction which would
have required that rumored communications from the Office of the President of the United
States to NHTSA be made part of the agency's public docket).
6 See notes 16, 28, and 31 infra.
7 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
8 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1984).
9 Id. at S2.
10 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962 (1984).
11 See generally 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962 (1984). The report of this 1984 NHTSA decision,
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determined that passive restraint systems alone are less effective
than the currently required seatbelts, when those seatbelts are used.
1 2
For this reason, NHTSA has expressed a preference for mandatory
seatbelt use laws over passive restraints. 13 The current version of
FMVSS 208 therefore will require the installation of passive re-
straints in the future, but that requirement is to be rescinded if a
sufficient number of states pass mandatory seatbelt use laws.'
4
Airbag proponents have been disappointed by NHTSA's con-
sistent refusal to mandate installation of airbags, and the latest
NHTSA decision has caused them to develop a new strategy and to
seek a new forum.' 5 They have shifted their efforts to the courts,
not in an effort to review directly the administrative proceedings
and determinations,' 6 but rather to set a new product liability rule
under state tort law authorizing juries to award damages from man-
ufacturers to any driver or passenger injured in a collision in which
an airbag might have reduced the plaintiff's injuries. 17 In the past
few years since the first appearance of the claim, manufacturers
which summarizes the study undertaken by NHTSA, covers 48 pages in the Federal
Register.
12 49 Fed. Reg. at 28,984-86.
13 "[Mandatory seatbelt use laws] will result in a more substantial reduction in deaths
and injuries more quickly and at a lower cost than any other practical alternative." 49 Fed.
Reg. at 28,998.
14 49 Fed. Reg. at 28,962-63, 29,009-10.
15 See The Air Bag Goes to Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1984, at D1, col. 4:
[A] small group of trial lawyers from around the nation has quietly developed a
new strategy that they hope will move the airbag question out of the regulatory
agencies and into the courts ...... We are trying to use economic pressure to
force them to offer air bags," said Joan Claybrook. . . one of the leading forces
behind the campaign.
16 Direct judicial review of the administrative agency's decisions has in the past been
pursued by airbag advocates with varying degrees of success. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (NHTSA decision to rescind
passive restraint requirement vacated as not supported by adequately articulated rationale);
Pacific Legal Found. v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (NHTSA
decision to allow four years lead time before mandatory installation of passive restraints
upheld). Airbag proponents have also challenged the latest NHTSA ruling on restraints
directly in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole, appeal docketed, No. 84-1301 (D.C. Cir.
July 11, 1984).
17 See Brief for the Air Bag Information Center, Inc. at 5, Evers v. General Motors
Corp., 770 F.2d 984 (11th Cir. 1985) (amicus curiae):
General Motors and its associates have succeeded in containing, indeed, para-
lyzing the executive and legislative processes. In our tripartite form of govern-
ment, only the judiciary remains. If Judges turn their heads away from those in
need of justice, they will have closed the loop.
The quality of mercy should never be strained in the name ofjustice. Justice
is not served by judicial rulings favoring an irresponsible defendant at the expense
of a plaintiff in need. Justice is supposed to remedy wrongs, not perpetuate them.
We, therefore, implore this Honorable Court to let the fate of the parties rest with
the time-honored traditions of our Constitution.
Let the jury decide.
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have seen the "no airbag" assertion of liability, even involving
automobiles that are eight or nine years old, with increasing
frequency.
This shift in battleground from federal administrative agency
to state tort law raises serious issues of federalism. This article will
first briefly recount the history of the airbag, from a technological,
marketing, and regulatory perspective, and will describe the tort
law theory asserting liability for failure to supply airbags in motor
vehicles. The article then analyzes the effect of two doctrines of
federalism: preemption and comity. The article concludes first that
federal law and FMVSS 208 preempt the state common law of torts
to the extent that the state tort standard is not identical to the stan-
dard of FMVSS 208, so that a state may not allow liability on the
"no airbag" claim. Second, the article concludes that even if state
law were not preempted, principles of comity require that states
shape their tort law with deference to the federal administrative de-
cisions embodied in FMVSS 208 and hold that the absence of
airbags in a vehicle does not constitute an actionable defect as a
matter of state law.
I. The History of Airbags and Federal Regulations
In 1953, the United States Patent Office granted John W. He-
trick a patent for a prototype airbag system, a safety cushion that
automatically inflated when the car decelerated rapidly.18 By the
early 1960's the major automobile manufacturers were engaged in
research and development programs for airbags. 19 Papers in engi-
neering journals were optimistic about the effectiveness and feasi-
bility of airbag systems,20 and in 1968 the government and
manufacturers were unanimous in supporting efforts to develop
workable airbag systems.2 1 In 1969, the National Highway Traffic
18 Teret & Downey, Air Bag Litigation: Promoting Passenger Safety, TRIAL, July 1982, at 93,
93-94. Apparently the first patent on a proposed airbag system was issued in 1935 to F.G.
Manson; see Snyder, A Survey of Automotive Occupant Restraint Problems: Where We've Been, Where
We Are, and Our Current Problems, SAE 690243, at 1019 (1969) (Society of Automotive Engi-
neers publication, hereinafter cited as SAE), and a prototype was developed in Czechoslo-
vakia during World War II. Id.
19 Teret & Downey, supra note 18, at 94.
20 See, e.g., Clark, Blechtschmidt & Gordon, Impact Protection with the "Airstop" Restraint
System, PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH STAPP CAR CRASH CONFERENCE 79 (1964); Clark &
Blechtschmidt, Human Transportation Fatalities and Protection Against Rear and Side Crash Loads
by the Airstop Restraint, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH STAPP CAR CRASH CONFERENCE 19 (1966);
Snyder, Young & Snow, Experimental Impact Protection with Advanced Automotive Restraint Sys-
tems: Preliminary Primate Tests with Air Bag and Inertia Reel/Inverted-Y Yoke Torso Harness, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH STAPP CAR CRASH CONFERENCE 271 (1967); Kemmerer, Chute,
Hass & Slack, Automatic Inflatable Occupant Restraint System, SAE 680033 (1968); Snyder, supra
note 18, at 1019; Roberts, Motor Vehicle Restraints, SAE 700418, at 985 (1970).
21 Teret & Downey, supra note 18, at 94.
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Safety Administration published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, requesting information on the merits of airbags. 22
This was to be the first of approximately 60 NHTSA rulemaking
notices imposing, amending, twice rescinding, and twice reimpos-
ing a passive restraint requirement. 23
In 1970, NHTSA amended Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Stan-
dard 208 to require24 the installation of passive restraints. The re-
quirement was to be effective July 1, 1973, for front seat occupants
and effective July 1, 1974, for all other occupants. 25 NHTSA was
criticized by many airbag experts for adopting this new passive re-
straint requirement. Some critics voiced safety concerns over the
then existing airbag system, arguing that further testing and devel-
opment was necessary before a workable airbag system would be
available.2 6 Others argued that even the best designed airbag sys-
tem provided less overall safety than the conventional lap and
shoulder belt system when used.27 In addition, the major auto
22 34 Fed. Reg. 11,148 (1969).
23 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34
(1983).
24 Making airbags available as an optional feature has not proven feasible. FMVSS 208
has for many years given manufacturers the option to restrain occupants with airbags or
other passive restraints instead of manual seat belts. In 1971, General Motors announced
its intention to make airbags available as optional equipment on some 1974, 1975, and
1976 luxury model cars. The company's goal was to sell approximately one hundred thou-
sand airbag-equipped cars over the three year period. See The Secretary's Decision Concerning
Motor Vehicle Occupant Crash Protection 4 (Dec. 6, 1976) (hereinafter cited as The Secretary's
Decision). At a price of $225 to $315, General Motors was able to sell only ten thousand
airbag-equipped cars. See Martin, Automatic Restraints-A Ten Year Learning Curve, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE INT'L SYMP. ON OCCUPANT RESTRAINT 151, 155 (June 1-3, 1981); The Secretary's
Decision at 4; 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289-90 (1977).
The 1977 NHTSA decision to suspend the passive restraint requirement was based in
part on the lack of public acceptance of airbags. See The Secretary's Decision at 11-12:
Every sampling of public opinion which has been brought to my attention, includ-
ing the analysis of the docket for the public hearing, indicates that a substantial
majority of Americans oppose the Federal government's mandating passive
restraints.
There is widespread and serious concern among members of the public with re-
spect to the likelihood and consequences of inadvertent air bag deployment, the
possibility that air bags may cause or exacerbate injuries, and the question of
whether air bags will deploy properly in situations in which they are needed.
Today only Mercedes-Benz offers airbags as an optional feature to the public. See 49 Fed.
Reg. 28,965 (1984). The government has purchased, by special contracts, a number of
airbag-equipped cars over the years for its own use. See Hricko, supra note 2, at 233-34 (831
1972 Mercurys, 1000 1973 Chevrolets, 75 1975 Volvos); 49 Fed. Reg. at 28,965 (5000 cars
on order from Ford for G.S.A.).
25 35 Fed. Reg. 16,927 (1970).
26 See, e.g., Clark, Human Head Linear and Angular Accelerations During Impact, SAE 710857
(1971); Campbell, Air Cushion Restraint Systems Development and Vehicle Application, SAE 720407
(1972); Klove & Oglesby, Special Problems and Considerations in the Development of Air Cushion
Restraint Systems, SAE 720411 (1972).
27 See, e.g., Pulley, Starter-Interlock Systems as Passive Restraints, SAE 720437 (1972); Pat-
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manufacturers except for General Motors challenged NHTSA's
legal authority to issue a passive restraint standard.
28
NHTSA responded to the first of these concerns, the inade-
quacy of the current systems, with a series of postponements of the
effective date for compliance. After a short postponement to Au-
gust 15, 1973,29 NHTSA next set August 15, 1975,30 as the date for
implementation of the passive restraint requirement. Subsequent
postponements moved the requirement back in increments of one
to four years. 31 The current date for installation of the first
mandatory passive restraints, unless the requirement is rescinded
or suspended again, is September 1, 1986.32
In 1981, NHTSA rescinded the passive restraint require-
ment.3 3 NHTSA concluded that manufacturers would comply with
the requirement by installing detachable automatic seatbelts rather
than airbags, and that the incremental safety benefits of these easy
to defeat devices would be insignificant.34 The Supreme Court, in
rick, Passive and Active Restraint Systems-Performance and Benefit/Cost Comparison, SAE 750389
(1975); Ventre, Rullier, Tarriere, Hartemann & Fayon, An Objective Analysis of the Protection
Offered by Active and Passive Restraint Systems, SAE 750393 (1975).
28 Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972). The court
rejected the manufacturers' challenge to NHTSA's authority, but held that the measuring
standard for compliance was not sufficiently objective, so the requirement was effectively
suspended.
29 36 Fed. Reg. 4600 (1971).
30 37 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1972). This postponement prompted the only direct action by
Congress on the issue of passenger restraint. NHTSA included an option to substitute a
device to compel the passengers to use the manual seatbelts-an ignition interlock system.
Public outcry over the ignition interlock system soon prompted Congress to void the igni-
tion interlock requirement by statute. 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(b) (1974). This statute also pro-
vided for a 60-day period during which Congress could disapprove, by means of a
concurrent resolution, any standard which required an occupant restraint system other than
seatbelts. 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(d) (1974). This congressional veto, however, is undoubtedly
unconstitutional after Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983). Finally, the statute stated that no safety standard could require any occupant re-
straint other than seatbelts unless NHTSA followed special procedures for promulgating
the rule. 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(c) (1974).
31 40 Fed. Reg. 33,977 (1975) (postponed until August 31, 1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 36,494
(1976) (postponed until August 31, 1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 5071 (1977) (suspended indefi-
nitely); 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (1977) (reimposed, to be phased in between September 1,
1981, and September 1, 1984); 46 Fed. Reg. 21,172 (1981) (postponed to September 1,
1982); 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981) (rescinded); 48 Fed. Reg. 39,908 (1983) (suspended
requirement until September 1, 1984 after recission was judicially reversed).
In response to the 1977 decision to reimpose the passive restraint requirement but
allow four to six years lead time for implementation, Ralph Nader and the Center for Auto
Safety obtained judicial review of the lead time provision. The court held the lead time
decision, founded on the need for additional time to develop a safe and reliable airbag
system, see 42 Fed. Reg. 61,466 (1977), to be reasonable and supported by the record.
Pacific Legal Found. v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 830 (1979).
32 49 Fed. Reg. at 29,009-10 (1984).
33 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981).
34 Id. at 53,423.
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reviewing the decision, held that NHTSA should have considered
mandating airbags or nondetachable seatbelts, which were not sub-
ject to the same objections as detachable automatic seatbelts, and
that NHTSA's failure to do so rendered its decision unsupported
by its articulated reasons. 35
In response to this decision, NHTSA undertook its most thor-
ough review of the passive restraint issue, holding hearings in three
cities and reviewing nearly 8000 public comments during the nine
month study period.3 6 NHTSA engaged in a sophisticated analysis
of the costs and effectiveness of various restraint systems. NHTSA
estimated that a full front (driver and front seat passenger) airbag
system would cost an additional $364.37 The three major manufac-
turers, however, indicated costs of $800-$838 for a full front airbag
system, and some manufacturers estimated as high as $1800.38
The more surprising findings, however, related to effective-
ness. First, airbags by themselves are effective only in frontal colli-
sions. Rear or side impact collisions or rollovers will not activate
the airbag because it has no capability to restrain the occupant from
the forces generated by these types of collisions.3 9 For this reason,
a lap belt or three point seatbelt 40 must be worn to provide com-
plete protection. 4'
Second, the three point seatbelt currently provided in most
cars, when it is worn, provides substantially greater protection than
an airbag alone, and equal protection to an airbag/lapbelt combina-
tion.42 If only 70% of the driving public wore their seatbelts, the
reduction in the fatality rate would be equivalent to the reduction
resulting from equipping the entire fleet of vehicles in the United
States with airbags. The reduction of moderate to critical injuries
would be substantially better for 70% belt usage than for 100%
airbag-equipped vehicles.43
Finally, the effectiveness figures must be adjusted by the time
needed to get the equipment to the public. Almost every car on the
road today already has the three point seatbelt, so this means of
35 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
36 See 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962, 28,963-64 (1984).
37 Id. at 28,989. This cost is the incremental cost, that is, the excess of the cost of
airbags over seatbelts and includes both manufacturing costs and the increased fuel use of
the heavier system.
38 Id. The Mercedes-Benz optional airbag, a driver-only system rather than a full front
system, is actually priced at $880. Id.
39 Id. at 28,973, 28,986.
40 The "three point" seatbelt is a lap and shoulder belt combination anchored to the
vehicle at three points.
41 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962, 28,984, 29,001.
42 Id. at 28,985.
43 Id. at 28,986, using the mid-point range of Table 5.
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restraint could be effective immediately. 44 NHTSA assumed that it
would take at least ten years from the initial installation until a new
safety device would be installed in the entire fleet of automobiles.45
For this reason, the benefits of passive restraints would not be felt
for many years.46 NHTSA therefore concluded that mandatory
seatbelt use laws "will result in a more substantial reduction in
deaths and injuries more quickly and at a lower cost than any other
practical alternative." 47
Lacking power to enact mandatory seatbelt use laws itself,
NHTSA decided to require installation of passive restraints on a
phased-in basis beginning on September 1, 1986, and becoming
applicable to all automobiles manufactured after September 1,
1989.48 This requirement will be rescinded, however, if states ac-
counting for two-thirds of the United States population pass
mandatory seatbelt use laws by April 1, 1989.49
Throughout this period, therefore, NHTSA has consistently
refused to require immediate installation of airbags, opting instead
for a phase-in system at some point in the future for safety and
economy reasons. NHTSA has now indicated its preference for
mandatory seatbelt use laws as the best means of passenger
restraint.
II. Product Liability Law and Airbags
Product liability law generally proceeds under one of two theo-
ries, negligence or strict liability.50 Negligence doctrine requires
that the manufacturer or seller act in a reasonably prudent fashion
in the design, manufacture, and sale of the product.5 ' If a breach of
that duty proximately causes injury, the tort is complete. Strict lia-
bility, whether it proceeds on a tort or warranty theory,52 focuses
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 28,986-87. NHTSA estimates that if 67% of the population is covered by
mandatory seatbelt use laws, and if there is 70% compliance with that law, in the first year
4,100 more lives would be saved than by an airbag and lapbelt requirement with the esti-
mated 12.5% lapbelt usage. As more airbags are installed, the death gap narrows until by
the ninth year enough airbags are in place to save as many lives as a seatbelt law with two-
thirds coverage and 70% compliance. Over the first ten years, such seatbelt laws would
save an estimated 16,530 more lives than airbags. See id., Table 6.
47 Id. at 28,998.
48 Id. at 28,963.
49 Id.
50 See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 641 (4th ed. 1971).
51 See id. at 644-45.
52 Strict liability in tort is described by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965). Many states proceed instead on a warranty theory, reading the implied warranty of
merchantability in § 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code to be coextensive with the
standards under Restatement § 402A, and rejecting any requirement for privity of contract
in such an implied warranty. The two theories, therefore, become identical in practice. See
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on the product itself rather than the producer, and imposes liability
when that product is "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous,"' 53
and causes injury to a user. In the case of a manufacturing defect,
the product may be unreasonably dangerous because of an error in
production, even though the manufacturer took reasonable care to
guard against such an error. In such a situation the manufacturer
would not be liable in negligence, but would be subject to strict
product liability. 54 In a design defect case, however, where the de-
sign is the result of a conscious choice, the negligence and strict
liability standards are functionally identical: the manufacturer is
negligent if it designs a product that is unreasonably dangerous. 55
In deciding whether a product is unreasonably dangerous and
therefore negligently designed, the courts make use of two tests,
the consumer expectation test and the risk-utility analysis. Under
the former, the product is unreasonably dangerous if it is "danger-
ous to an extent beyond that which is contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it ... .- 56 The latter test, probably the
majority rule,57 requires the balancing of a variety of factors to de-
termine whether any alternative design would have provided sub-
stantially greater protection from the risk of injury without a
substantial sacrifice in the utility of the product or a substantial in-
crease in its cost.
5 8
As a starting point in this analysis, the product itself must be
reasonably safe for its intended uses. As of 1966, the law indicated
that a collision was not the use for which automobiles were in-
tended. 59 Thus, manufacturers had to design automobiles to drive
reasonably safely, but not to crash reasonably safely. Under this
analysis a manufacturer would be liable if a defect in the car caused
the initial collision, but it would not be liable for the enhanced inju-
ries resulting from the failure of the vehicle to protect the occupant
in a collision that was caused by someone or something else.60
By 1968, however, another view had emerged, 6 1 a view that is
W. PROSSER, supra note 50, at 658. See, e.g., Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628,
629-31, 378 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (1978).
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
54 See W. PROSSER, supra note 50, at 650-51, 661.
55 See id. at 644-45, 659 n.72.
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). See also W. PROSSER,
supra note 50, at 659 ("The prevailing interpretation of 'defective' is that the product does
not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its safety.").
57 See Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the
Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773, 777 (1979).
58 See Note, The Relationship Between Federal Standards and Litigation in the Control of Automo-
bile Design, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 804, 815-17 (1982).
59 See Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
60 See W. PROSSER, supra note 50, at 646.
61 See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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dominant today. 62 That view held manufacturers liable if they
failed to design a vehicle that was reasonably "crashworthy" so that
the risk of injury from a collision was minimized within reasonable
limits. Under this view, the intended use was not so important as
what foreseeable uses would be made of the product and in what
type of environment it should be expected to operate. Manufactur-
ers have a duty under this doctrine to design their vehicles pru-
dently so that they will not be unreasonably dangerous to the user,
taking account of the likelihood of collision.
The earliest mention of a duty to install airbags under this
product liability standard appears to be in 1977, when the General
Counsel of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety warned man-
ufacturers that by their opposition to airbags, they "may be subject-
ing themselves to a flood of tort litigation in the near future." 63 In
an article published in the Federation of Insurance Counsel Quarterly, the
General Counsel argued that the majority of courts require a vehi-
cle to be crashworthy and that the foreseeability of users failing to
use the manual seatbelts makes the choice to provide such seatbelts
rather than airbags an unreasonable design choice. 64 The article ap-
parently was not widely read by plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers, 65
and no such claims were filed against manufacturers until some
years later when another article making this argument appeared in
Trial,66 the journal of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.
An increasing number of "no airbag" product liability claims have
been filed against automobile manufacturers since that time, in-
cluding one class action against all the major automakers for dam-
62 See Comment, Occupant Protection in Automobiles-Air Bags and Other Passive Restraints:
The State of the Art, the Federal Standard, and Beyond, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 635, 639 (1978).
63 Hricko, supra note 2, at 238. See also Comment, supra note 62, at 671 ("The current
technology also supports a claim of liability against a manufacturer who fails to utilize pas-
sive restraints.").
64 It would seem unjust to hold a manufacturer responsible for an occupant's injuries
for failing to supply one type of safety device when the injuries would probably have been
prevented by the occupant's use of another, equally effective safety device which was sup-
plied. Nevertheless, only a minority of jurisdictions currently recognize the "seatbelt de-
fense," even in crashworthiness cases, though that minority may be expanding. See Note,
Oklahoma and the Seat Belt Defense: Should Fields be Reconsidered?, 10 OKLA. CITy U.L. REV. 153
(1985).
65 See Teret & Downey, supra note 18, at 128 n.9.
66 Teret & Downey, supra note 18.
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) has continued to advocate the
position that manufacturers should be strictly liable for failure to install airbags. See Coben,
Building a Crashworthy Car, TRIAL, July 1985, at 28. In addition, ATLA has lent its resources
to the movement to avoid the regulatory process and force installation of airbags through
product liability damages actions, and makes available to plaintiffs' lawyers a file with fac-
tual and legal research and the names of other lawyers handling no-airbag cases. See Col-
umn, Products Liability, TRIAL, July 1985, at 74, 75-76.
19851
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ages on behalf of all front seat passengers injured in front end
collisions in Florida.
67
The only case to have considered the legal validity of a "no
airbag" claim is Evers v. General Motors Corp. 68 In Evers, the plaintiff
was injured when a drunk driver ran a stop sign and crashed into
her car.69 She sued General Motors alleging that her 1977 Pontiac
was negligently designed and unreasonably dangerous because it
did not include an airbag restraint system.7 0 The court entered
summary judgment for General Motors, holding that as a matter of
Florida tort law, absence of an airbag did not make an automobile
unreasonably dangerous or negligently designed. The court noted
that mandatory installation of airbags had been the subject of fed-
eral study and regulation:
Such a [no airbag] claim is admittedly controversial as use of the"air bag" restraint system has been strongly urged in recent
years and is also under consideration presently by the Depart-
ment of Transportation.7 1
The court also noted the enormous liability that recognition of such
a claim would create, 72 and held:
Notwithstanding the safety benefits which would attain from
mandatory use of the airbag system, this Court is unwilling to
declare such a requirement as a new basis for tort liabilty [sic]. 73
The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
67 Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., No. 84-6467 (S.D. Fla. filed May 18, 1984). Defendants
include Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation, Chrysler Corporation, Ameri-
can Motors Corporation, Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association, Honda Motor Com-
pany, Ltd., American Honda Motors, Inc., Volkswagen of America, Inc., Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., and Nissan Motor Corp., in U.S.A.
The class is defined as:
... all frontseat passengers and drivers who were citizens and residents of
the State of Florida, and whose injuries were enhanced by the uncrashworthiness
of passenger automobiles manufactured, designed, and/or distributed by the de-
fendants since 1972, and who were involved in front-end collisions in the State of
Florida within the last four years from the institution of this suit against each
defendant.
Fourth Amended Complaint, Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., supra.
68 No. 81-1108 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 1984) (unpublished opinion); aff'd on other grounds,
770 F.2d 984 (1 1th Cir. 1985). See also Kern v. General Motors Corp., No. 83-CV91 11 (D.
Colo. July 9, 1985) (unpublished opinion) (manufacturer has no duty to supply passive
seatbelts).
69 Evers v. General Motors Corp., supra note 68, slip op. at 1-2.
70 Id. at 2.
71 Id. at4.
72 Id. at 5. Presumably manufacturers would be liable to all front seat passengers in-
jured in frontal or near frontal collisions since the date when airbags were, according to a
jury's determination, technologically feasible. Statutes of limitations would cut off many
older claims, but the potential liability remains staggering.
73 Id.
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for the Eleventh Circuit, 74 and was supported in her efforts to have
lack of airbags declared an actionable defect by amicus briefs from
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Trial Lawyers for Pub-
lic Justice, P.C., the Airbag Information Center, Inc., the American
Public Health Association, and the National Association for Public
Health Policy. The case was to be the first test of a strategy to force
manufacturers to install airbags through the financial pressure of
personal injury damages actions.75 The Court of Appeals, however,
affirmed the District Court on the narrower ground that the plain-
tiff's affidavits did not show that an airbag would have been effec-
tive in the circumstances of this accident. 76
This strategy raises questions about the proper relation be-
tween a federal regulatory agency's decisions and state tort law.
When a federal regulatory agency has studied the very device at
issue and has promulgated a standard balancing the various inter-
ests, should state tort law remain available as an alternative route to
undercut that federal decision? To what extent should the federal
standard have preemptive effect on the state tort law? To what ex-
tent should the state court defer in the interests of comity to the
federal agency's standard? 77
74 770 F.2d 984 (11th Cir. 1985).
75 The idea of using product liability damage actions to force manufacturers to install
airbags in light of NHTSA decisions not to mandate immediate airbag installation was
presented in Teret & Downey, supra note 18, at 93, 99:
The failure to make available the most effective method of reducing motor
vehicle deaths and injuries can be an actionable wrong, and the initiation of airbag
litigation may be the most effective way of getting air bags in cars.
Product liability law fosters injury prevention by creating a financial incentive
to design safe products. The importance of this function of product litigation be-
comes even greater when the executive and administrative offices of government
choose not to regulate industry for the benefit of public health and safety. The
message of large verdicts for the failure to make air bags available can be loudly
heard by automobile manufacturers, and has the potential for being more effective
than the attempts to regulate over the past dozen years.
After the most recent NHTSA decision, the idea developed into a campaign by airbag
advocates, led by former NHTSA directorJoan Claybrook, to press numerous "no airbag"
product liability lawsuits in an effort to "move the airbag question out of the regulatory
agencies and into the courts" and to use "economic pressure to force [manufacturers] to
offer air bags." See The Air Bag Goes to Court, supra note 15.
76 Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985).
77 Other constitutional issues may be raised as well, including federalism questions.
For example, Michael Hoenig argues that state tort product liability claims for defective
design raise not only preemption problems, see Hoenig, Resolution of "Crashworthiness" Design
Claims, 55 ST.JoHN's L. REv. 633, 706-18 (1981), but also constitute an impermissible bur-
den on interstate commerce, see id. at 718-22, and violate the due process clause, see id. at
722-25.
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III. Preemption in "No Airbag" Tort Claims
A. Federal Preemption Doctrine
The supremacy clause 78 of the United States Constitution dic-
tates that when Congress has enacted legislation which is "neces-
sary and proper" 79 to implement one of its plenary powers, any
state law which comes into conflict with the federal law is pre-
empted.80  Preemption occurs under two circumstances. First,
Congress may, through comprehensive regulation8 ' or through a
specific statutory declaration, 82 "occupy the field" so that the states
are powerless to enforce any state law on the subject. If federal law
has so occupied the field, even state laws which are consistent with
or supplementary to the federal law are invalid, because Congress
has impliedly taken exclusive control of the subject.8 3 In addition,
when Congress has so occupied the field but failed to legislate con-
cerning a particular aspect of the field, a state may not, consistent
with preemption doctrine, legislate on that aspect. Under these cir-
cumstances, Congress has implicitly evidenced a desire that that as-
pect remain unregulated; any regulation by the state conflicts with
the federal law and is preempted. This type of preemption may be
called "type 1 preemption."
Congressional legislation may not always occupy the field.
Congress may instead only regulate a particular aspect, leaving the
states free to regulate other aspects. When a state law conflicts with
a federal statute which is on-point, or if the state law frustrates the
purposes and objectives of Congress in enacting the federal law,
the state law will be preempted by the federal law under the
supremacy clause.84 The federal statute will not preempt state law
on other parts of the field, but will preempt any state law on the
particular subject to which the federal statute is directed. This sec-
ond type of preemption may be called "type 2 preemption." In a
sense, Congress in a type 2 preemption situation has occupied the
78 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
80 See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITTrIONAL LAW 317-27 (11th ed. 1985);J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292-96 (2d ed. 1983).
81 See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
82 See, e.g.,Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
83 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S.
297 (1961).
84 Such a conflict exists not only when compliance with both state and federal law is
impossible, cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), but
more frequently when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941). See also Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
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limited field of the aspect the statute regulates, and any state laws
affecting that aspect are therefore preempted.
B. Preemption Under the Vehicle Safety Act
In the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,85
Congress established a uniform comprehensive regulatory scheme
governing the safety design features of motor vehicles. The Act in-
tended to place "primary responsibility" for setting safety stan-
dards "squarely upon the Federal Government."8 6 Recognizing
the states' past contributions to safety regulation, Congress rele-
gated the states to "a consultive role in the setting of standards."8 7
To carry out this federal responsibility, the Act directs the Secretary
of Transportation or his delegate to issue motor vehicle safety stan-
dards applicable to all motor vehicles manufactured for sale or im-
ported into the United States.88 The Secretary of Transportation
has delegated this authority to promulgate safety standards to the
Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion. Hundreds of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards directed
at countless aspects of motor vehicle safety performance and design
have been promulgated by NHTSA under this authority.8 9
If Congress had been silent as to the preemptive effect of this
Act, it is possible that the courts might have determined that Con-
gress had occupied the entire field of motor vehicle safety. Thus,
through type 1 preemption, any state statutory or common law per-
taining to motor vehicle safety would be invalid. This interpreta-
tion of the preemptive intent of Congress might then have nullified
any state's product liability law, leaving those injured by safety de-
fects in motor vehicles to pursue their remedies exclusively under
the federal regulatory scheme. If no express private cause of action
for damages was created by the Act, the courts might have deter-
mined that Congress, by occupying the field of vehicle safety regu-
lation, by creating a scheme of public regulatory enforcement of the
standards, and further by creating no private right of action, had
85 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1966).
86 S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2709, 2712.
87 Id. (emphasis added).
88 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392, 1397 (1982).
89 Federal regulations have the same effect as a federal statute in preemption doctrine.
If federal regulations occupy a field, or evidence an intent to foreclose state regulation of a
particular aspect of a field, or if the state law would conflict with the requirements, purposes
or objectives of a federal regulation, then the state law is preempted. See Fidelity Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104
S. Ct. 2694 (1984); Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 105
S. Ct. 2371 (1985).
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purposefully deprived individuals of the ability to recover privately
for injuries caused by safety design defects. 90
In enacting this comprehensive federal regulatory scheme,
Congress faced three choices: (1) allowing the risk that injured in-
dividuals might be deprived of their cause of action; (2) creating a
private federal cause of action for motor vehicle safety defects; or
(3) expressing a more limited preemptive intention which would al-
low the continued existence of state law, including the state law
cause of action for damages, so long as that state law did not con-
flict in some way with the federal regulations. Congress chose to
express a limited preemption:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established
under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivi-
sion of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to
continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of
motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the
same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equip-
ment which is not identical to the Federal standard.9 1
In essence, rather than occupying the entire field of automo-
bile safety through type 1 preemption, Congress has chosen to im-
plement type 2 preemption: state safety standards or any state
common or statutory law which is "applicable to the same aspect of
performance" as the federal regulation, and which is "not identi-
cal" to the federal regulation, is preempted.
92
It is noteworthy that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966 is unlike other federal regulatory schemes, which
set minimum standards93 and allow states to impose more stringent
requirements. 94 The key to the difference in preemptive effect of
90 See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), holding
that Congress, through the National Labor Relations Act, had occupied the field of labor
management relations, preempting a state tort claim for damages based on a union's
organizational picketing. Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984), holding
that the Atomic Energy Act did not preempt a state tort claim for damages based on a
violation of the federal standards. Despite the "tension" between exclusive federal regula-
tion and the "regulatory consequence" of an award of damages under state tort law, the
Court held that because Congress had clearly expressed its intent, through other legisla-
tion, to tolerate that tension, such tort claims were not preempted.
91 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1982).
92 When the state acts as a consumer and buys vehicles for its own use, the statute
allows it to require higher safety standards. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1982).
93 Occasional references to FMVSS as "minimum standards" refer to the fact that man-
ufacturers may exceed the standards if they choose to. See 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2) (1982).
The standards are not "minimum standards" with regard to the states, however; no state
may enforce a higher standard or any standard "not identical" to the FMVSS. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1392(d) (1982).
94 See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446 (10th Cir. 1976) (Civil
Aeronautics Authority only empowered, by terms of statute, to establish minimum stan-
dards governing aircraft design); Hubbard-Hall Chemical Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402,
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various federal regulatory schemes is the intent of Congress as ex-
pressed or implied in the statutes. For example, in Raymond v. Rie-
gel Textile Corp.,95 the court rejected an argument that compliance
with the Federal Flammability Act barred liability in tort. The
plaintiff suffered injuries when her flannelette nightgown, manufac-
tured in conformance with the standards of flammability estab-
lished by the Act, was ignited by a hot grill on an electric range.
The plaintiff brought suit under New Hampshire tort law and the
defendant raised a preemption argument. The Act was "intended
to supersede any [state] law. . . inconsistent with its provisions." 96
The Court of Appeals reviewed the legislative history of the Act and
concluded that Congress did not intend to preempt tort law recov-
ery. The court determined that the phrase "inconsistent with its
provisions" referred to the underlying policies of the Act to in-
crease the safety of consumers, particularly the young and aged.
Accordingly, the court found that "New Hampshire's application of
its strict liability standard in tort actions is not 'inconsistent with
[the] provisions' of the Flammable Fabrics Act."
97
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, on
the other hand, declares its regulations to be totally preemptive
with regard to the aspect of performance that they govern. States
may enforce only "identical" regulations under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1392(d), not ones which are less or even more demanding. 98 The
choice of the word "identical" rather than "inconsistent" manifests
an apparent intent to preempt all state regulations which do not
mirror the precise requirements of federal regulations promulgated
under the Act, rather than merely those state regulations which do
not comport with the general policies underlying the Act.
This unusually strong preemption clause in the statute was in-
tended to express serious congressional concern for the need for
uniformity in safety standards for the sake of both the automobile
industry and the driving public:
The centralized, mass production, high volume character of the
motor vehicle manufacturing industry in the United States re-
quires that motor vehicle safety standards be not only strong
405 (1st Cir. 1965) (federal labeling requirements imposed on manufacturers of poisonous
insecticides constitute minimum standards only for shipping in interstate commerce; no
evidence of congressional intent to preempt field of negligence); Rucker v. Norfolk & West-
ern Ry., 77 Ill. 2d 434, 440, 396 N.E.2d 534, 537 (1979) (despite some federal standards
relative to construction of LPG tank cars, no congressional intent to preempt state tort law).
95 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973).
96 15 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (1970).
97 484 F.2d at 1027. Accord American Apparel Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Sargent, 384 F. Supp. 289
(D. Mass. 1974).
98 See Boating Industry Ass'n v. Boyd, 409 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1969); Chrysler
Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499, 513 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J., concurring).
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and adequately enforced, but that they be uniform throughout
the country. 99
Basically this preemption subsection is intended to result in uni-
formity of standards so that the public as well as industry will be
guided by one set of criteria rather than by a multiplicity of di-
verse standards.' 00
In light of this strong need for national uniformity of stan-
dards, courts have held that federal regulations preempt non-iden-
tical state standards, 0 1 and have even declared invalid state pre-
sale approval processes which required greater proof of compliance
with federal safety standards than did the federal scheme. 10 2 On
the other hand, courts have held that where the FMVSS does not
govern "the same aspect of performance" as the state standard, 15
U.S.C. § 1392(d) does not require preemption. 10 3 15 U.S.C.
§ 1392(d), therefore, represents a strong type 2 preemption stat-
ute, prohibiting enforcement of any state safety standard which is
not identical to an on-point federal standard.
In one of its most recent cases on preemption doctrine, the
Supreme Court contrasted a federal concern for setting minimum
standards with the federal concern for setting uniform standards.
04
If a federal regulatory scheme's interest is in setting minimum stan-
dards, then a state standard will conflict with that purpose only if it
is lower than the federal one;10 5 a higher or equally strict state stan-
dard does not in any way undercut the federal interest. Even a state
standard which is merely different, which cannot be said to be
99 S. REP. No. 1301, supra note 86, at 2720.
100 H.R. REP. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1966).
101 See, e.g., Vehicle Equipment Safety Comm'n v. National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
min., 611 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1979).
102 See, e.g.,Juvenile Prods. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Edmisten, 568 F. Supp. 714 (E.D.N.C. 1983);
Truck Safety Equipment Inst. v. Kane, 466 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1979). See also National
Ass'n of Motor Bus Owners v. Brineger, 483 F.2d 1294, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Robinson,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (strongly emphasizing the extensive preemp-
tion effect intended by Congress).
103 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1969); Chrysler Corp. v.
Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Guest, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 941, 425
N.E.2d 779 (1981).
104 Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 105 S, Ct. 2371, 2380 n.5
(1985):
Two of the amici argue the county ordinances interfere with the federal inter-
est in uniform plasma standards. There is no merit to that argument. The federal
interest at stake here is to ensure minimum standards, not uniform standards. In-
deed, the FDA's 1973 statement makes clear that additional, nonconflicting re-
quirements do not interfere with federal goals, and we have found no reason to
doubt the continued validity of that statement.
105 Indeed a real conflict will arise only if the state standard requires lower performance
than the federal one, or penalizes performance which exceeds the lower state standard. A
lower state standard which may be exceeded with impunity has no effect on compliance
with a higher federal standard.
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higher or lower, will not impose upon the federal interest if both
the federal minimum and the state standard can be complied
with.10 6 If the federal interest is in setting uniform standards, how-
ever, then any state standard which is different from the federal
standard, whether it is higher or lower or uses a different measure,
would conflict with that policy of uniformity.10 7 15 U.S.C.
§ 1392(d) and its legislative history indicate that once NHTSA has
set a safety standard on a particular "aspect of performance," while
it is a minimum standard in the sense that the manufacturer may
exceed it, it is meant to be a uniform national standard. No state
may enforce a non-identical safety standard applicable to the same
aspect of performance,
C. Preemption of Common Law Remedies
State safety standards have the potential to be enforced
through a variety of methods, including jury verdicts in common
law actions. If those state standards are not identical to existing on-
point federal regulations, however, jury verdict enforcement of
them should not be allowed.'0 8 The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that a verdict in a state common law action has the
effect of formal state regulation:
[R]egulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of
damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obliga-
tion to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a
potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.
Even the States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or
grant compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate
activities that are potentially subject to the exclusive federal reg-
ulatory scheme.10 9
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 0 the Court held
106 See, e.g., Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (federal
avocado ripeness regulations set "minimum" not "uniform" standards and do not preempt
California avocado ripeness requirements based on different measure).
107 See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) (federal tobacco identification
standards preempt complementary but non-identical state standards).
108 See Hoenig, supra note 77, at 706-18 (state tort claims on crashworthiness theory
based on standards not identical with FMVSS may be preempted).
This aspect of preemption doctrine should not be confused with the issue in tort doctrine
as to the effect of compliance with governmental regulations, state or federal, on the ques-
tion of negligence. Some states hold, as a matter of tort doctrine, that compliance with
either type of governmental regulation is evidence of due care but not conclusive on the
question. On the other hand, many commentators suggest it should be conclusive, at least
in certain circumstances. See text accompanying notes 172-77 infra. This resolution of the
tort issue, however, has no effect on the preemption issue raised when the regulation is a
federal one.
109 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) (citation
omitted).
110 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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that the National Labor Relations Act preempted a state law tort
claim for damages caused by a union's picketing. Since Congress
had regulated the subject of labor relations, the state was powerless
to regulate the same subject through its common law of torts. Simi-
larly, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,"' the Court held that a
state may not, through a common law damage claim for unfair com-
petition, enforce a state common law standard which "clashes with
the objectives of the federal patent laws."" 2 State tort law is thus
the equivalent of state statutes or regulations in setting and enforc-
ing state standards. When the state tort standard conflicts with the
federal regulation, it is preempted.
More recently, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.," 3 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed this analysis. Prior to Silkwood, the Supreme
Court held that Congress occupied the field of nuclear energy
safety in enacting the Atomic Energy Act, 1 4 thus preempting all
state regulation through type 1 preemption." 5 Silkwood presented
the question of whether the federal standards also preempted a
state common law award of damages for violation of those stan-
dards. The Court looked to the intent of Congress and found evi-
dence that, in the atomic energy field, Congress intended to allow
private tort remedies for violation of federal standards to remain in
effect."16 The Court was careful to note, however, that while Con-
gress did not intend to preempt all state tort law with type 1 pre-
emption in this case, enforcement of state tort standards which are
in conflict with the federal regulatory standards would not be al-
lowed because of type 2 preemption.
17
Since Silkwood's claim was that Kerr-McGee had not complied
with federal standards, the state tort standards and federal regula-
tions did not conflict, and thus Silkwood's claim was not pre-
empted. Silkwood specifically recognized that state law tort claims
111 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
112 Id. at 231.
113 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
114 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1982).
115 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1983).
116 104 S. Ct. at 623-26. Congress had passed the Price-Anderson Act, an amendment
to the Atomic Energy Act, creating an indemnification scheme for state law tort suits
against nuclear power plant operators.
117 According to the court:
[Insofar as damages for radiation injuries are concerned, preemption should not
be judged on the basis that the federal government has so completely occupied the
field of safety that state remedies are foreclosed but on whether there is an irrec-
oncilable conflict between the federal and state standards or whether the imposi-
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can establish and enforce regulatory standards and ruled that such
claims will be allowed so long as they are consistent with federal
regulations. However, state claims which conflict with or frustrate
the objectives of the federal regulatory scheme will be
preempted."18
In two recent product liability tort cases, however, lower fed-
eral courts have rejected preemption defenses based on federal la-
beling requirements. In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.," 9 the
plaintiff sued for injuries sustained because of exposure to para-
quat, alleging that the warning on the label, which had been ap-
proved by the federal Environmental Protection Agency, was
inadequate. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. ,120 the plaintiff sued for
damages from the lung cancer she allegedly contracted by smoking
cigarettes. The defendants argued that the federally mandated
warning of the health hazards from smoking cigarettes preempted
the state tort claim.
In both Ferebee and Cipollone, the courts rested their decisions
on two bases. First, these courts stated that setting a tort standard
for liability was not the equivalent of state regulation because the
manufacturer need not change his conduct; he could comply with
the federal regulation and pay damages for violating the state tort
standard. The same could be said, however, for traditional state
regulations which conflict with federal regulations. The manufac-
turer could always follow the federal standard and pay the fine for
violating the state one. The preemption question is properly
whether the manufacturer can comply with both state and federal
standards, not whether he can comply with one and pay the price
for resulting noncompliance with the other. Thus 15 U.S.C.
§ 1392(d) forbids the setting of a-non-identical standard. Whether or
not a tort judgment "regulates" by requiring a change in conduct,
it is clear that a tort judgment must be based on some legal stan-
dard. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) requires that standard to be identical to
the federal standard.
The second basis for the Ferebee and Cipollone decisions was a
purported distinction between the "purposes" of the federal regu-
lations-to protect the environment or to regulate cigarette adver-
tising and labeling-and the "purpose" of state tort law-to
compensate injured claimants. Again this analysis misconstrues
preemption doctrine. The Supreme Court has specifically held that
the effect of the state rule, not its purpose, will govern its validity in
118 See also Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 F.2d 1552, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1983) (state
common law remedies were preempted because they conflicted with the purposes of the
federal regulatory scheme).
119 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
120 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.NJ. 1984).
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preemption analysis. 121 The proper question, therefore, is not
whether the purposes of the state and federal systems are in con-
flict, but rather whether the effect of the state rule is to frustrate the
purpose of the federal scheme. The Ferebee and Cipollone position
would mean that state tort law, with its compensatory purpose,
would never be preempted by a federal regulatory scheme with its
regulatory purpose, a result clearly rejected by the Supreme Court.
Congress and the Department of Transportation, through
NHTSA, have struggled to achieve the proper balance between
considerations of safety, cost, effectiveness, and personal conven-
ience in occupant restraint systems. This balancing is required by
15 U.S.C. § 1392(f), which requires that in prescribing FMVSS, the
Secretary shall "consider whether any such proposed standard is
reasonable, practicable and appropriate. . . ." In striking this bal-
ance, NHTSA has given intense scrutiny to the use of seatbelts of
various types and to passive restraints, including airbags, and has
refused to require immediate installation of airbags. 122 Instead,
NHTSA has consistently permitted manufacturers to satisfy federal
occupant restraint requirements by any of several approved meth-
ods, including a seatbelt system.
If a state allowed a jury to hold a manufacturer liable and
award damages for failure to install airbags, it would effectively set
a state safety standard requiring airbags. Manufacturers would be
required, despite the NHTSA decision to the contrary, to install
airbags immediately or face substantial damage awards. 123 A ruling
allowing an allegation of lack of airbags to constitute a claim for
relief under state law would impermissibly "establish or continue in
effect. . . [a] safety standard applicable to the same aspect of per-
formance [as the FMVSS]. . . which is not identical to the Federal
Standard."1 24
D. Effect of the Vehicle Safety Act's Savings Clause
At the same time it enacted the preemption clause, Congress
enacted a general savings clause providing that compliance with
FMVSS will not necessarily provide an exemption from liability
121 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971).
122 See 42 Fed. Reg. 61,466 (1977) (rationale for lead time requirements); Pacific Legal
Found. v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (lead time require-
ments upheld).
123 Indeed, even immediate installation would be too late. Manufacturers would be ex-
posed to enormous liability in connection with the millions of vehicles already on the roads.
See note 72 supra.
124 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1982).
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under state common law.125 Although this section might be read in
simplistic fashion to provide that the FMVSS does not affect state
common law, such a reading is clearly illogical and unsupported by
the case law. A better reading of the savings clause would construe
it consistently with the rest of the Act. The clause would then de-
feat the type 1 preemption argument that compliance with FMVSS
automatically exempts the manufacturer from liability on all safety
defects, even those not covered by an on-point FMVSS. The clause
would not, however, allow a state to set a tort standard different
from a FMVSS directed to the particular claimed defect at issue in
the case.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that savings
clauses similar to section 1397(c) may not be applied literally so as
to permit any state common law remedies, even those which con-
flict with the federal scheme. Rather, such savings clauses should
be read to permit only state common law remedies which do not
frustrate the purposes and objectives of the federal regulatory sys-
tem. 126 The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted savings
clauses, no matter how broadly written, to apply only when the
state common law was not in conflict with the regulatory scheme.
1 27
The logic of these cases is compelling. If the savings clause
125 The savings clause provides:
Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this sub-
chapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.
15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1982).
126 In Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907), for exam-
ple, the Court held that the Interstate Commerce Act preempted a state common law claim
despite a savings clause in the Act which provided:
Nothing in this act contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now
existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are in addition
to such remedies.
Id. at 446.
The Court refused to apply this savings clause literally, but ruled instead that the stat-
ute must be construed to apply only to state common law remedies which do not conflict
with the federal regulatory scheme:
This clause, however, cannot in reason be construed as continuing in shippers a
common law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsis-
tent with the provisions of the act. In other words, the act cannot be held to de-
stroy itself.
Id.
As recently as 1981, the Supreme Court reemphasized that the broad savings clause of
the Interstate Commerce Act could not be read to allow state common law remedies which
conflicted with the federal regulatory system, In Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick
& Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981), an Iowa common law damage claim was preempted be-
cause it allowed recovery of damages in tort for abandonment of a rail line when that aban-
donment had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Court rejected
the plaintiffis argument that the savings clause allowed state tort remedies to continue.
127 See, e.g., T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 473 (1959); Arrow Transp. Co.
v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658, 671 (1963). Cf. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S.
290, 298-300 (1976).
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were read in literal and simplistic fashion to relieve state common
law from normal rules of preemption, the state common law could
frustrate the purposes of the federal regulatory scheme and effec-
tively nullify the federal law. Suppose, for example, the alleged de-
fect in a state common law action was the presence of equipment
which the FMVSS required. A plaintiff might claim that a car was
unreasonably dangerous because the windshield did not pop out in
a crash, and when he struck the windshield, he was injured.128 The
FMVSS, however, might provide that windshields must remain in
place during a crash so that occupants are not ejected. 129 In this
circumstance, where the alleged defect is required by federal regula-
tions, preemption doctrine would surely apply to block state com-
mon law liability. State law cannot make a manufacturer liable for
complying with federal law. The provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c)
may not properly be read in a simplistic way to provide total free-
dom for state common law to develop, even in a way which conflicts
with the federal regulatory scheme. Rather, courts must reconcile
the language and spirit of the preemption clause, section 1392(d),
and the savings clause, section 1397(c).
In harmonizing preemption doctrine and general savings
clauses, the courts have applied a conflict analysis. Under this anal-
ysis, common law remedies will not be preempted in their entirety
by type 1 preemption, but any remedies which conflict with the pur-
poses of the federal regulatory scheme will be preempted by type 2
preemption. Assume, for example, that NHTSA had promulgated
FMVSS regulating the brightness of headlights, and the subject ve-
hicle complied with those regulations. A state law cause of action
claiming that the headlights were not bright enough would be pre-
empted by the federal regulation and compliance with the FMVSS
would be a complete defense. On the other hand, a state law cause
of action claiming that the tail lights, not directly covered by any
FMVSS, were not bright enough would not be preempted; NHTSA
has not occupied the entire field of "brightness of lights." Compli-
ance with the FMVSS on headlights would thus not exempt the
manufacturer from liability for defective design in the tail lights.
Similarly, a tort claim that the headlights were not properly located
would not be preempted, since the FMVSS does not purport to reg-
ulate all aspects of the headlights, only their brightness. Under a
conflict analysis, the tort claim conflicts with the federal regulations
and is preempted only when it sets a non-identical standard di-
128 This was the claimed defect in Gray v. General Motors Corp., 434 F.2d 110 (8th Cir.
1970). Preemption was neither raised as a defense nor considered by the court.
129 See FMVSS 212, 49 C.F.R. § 571.212 (1984).
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rected to the "same aspect of performance" as the FMVSS. 30
This conflict analysis is consistent with both the language and
the policies of sections 1392(d) and 1397(c). Determining that a
state law cause of action may allege only a defect not specifically
addressed by a FMVSS, or which fails to comply with an applicable
FMVSS, and may not allege as defective an item permitted by an
on-point FMVSS, would enforce the statute's mandate that
"[w]henever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in effect, no
State. . .shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue
in effect . . . any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not
identical to the Federal standard."'' 1 This analysis furthers the
policy of section 1392(d) to insure nationwide uniformity of safety
standards so that manufacturers and consumers can order their
lives with some degree of predictability. When federal standards
on the subject have been promulgated, they preempt state stan-
dards and set the measure for liability so that compliance with the
federal standards constitutes a defense. If no FMVSS has been
promulgated on the subject, however, the need for uniformity is
not substantial. State common law may, under these circumstances,
define the standard through its determination of what allegations of
a design defect will state a claim for relief under state product liabil-
ity law.
The common law savings clause, section 1397(c), is best under-
stood as an effort to block the argument that it is NHTSA's exclu-
sive province to define safety standards and unsafe design defects.
Such an argument would render states powerless to hold a manu-
facturer liable for a design defect if the vehicle met the standards
established by NHTSA. The savings clause indicates that while
NHTSA standards are exclusive when they apply, they are not exhaus-
tive. NHTSA may not have regulated some safety defects, either
because it has not become aware of them or because the required
administrative procedures which must be complied with before a
regulation becomes effective have not yet been completed. In that
case, states should remain free to plug the holes in NHTSA's regu-
lations, either through statutory standards, or through the stan-
dards of their common law of product liability. For this reason,
130 Courts have strictly limited the scope of the "aspect of performance" preemption of
FMVSS, for example holding that Standard 108 governing "lamps, reflective devices and
associated equipment" did not regulate auxiliary lighting, so that states could prohibit use
of overly bright auxiliary headlights. See Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1st Cir.
1969); Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Commonwealth v.
Guest, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 941, 425 N.E.2d 779 (1981) (state statute mandating motorcycle
helmet use not preempted by FMVSS which sets standards for such helmets).
131 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1982).
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Congress noted that "[c]ompliance with . .. [federal safety] stan-
dards would thus not necessarily shield any person from product lia-
bility at common law."' 132
The first several automotive product liability cases decided
shortly after NHTSA was created support this interpretation of the
savings clause. Manufacturers raised the type 1 preemption argu-
ment, asserting that by creating NHTSA and the federal regulatory
system governing automotive safety, Congress had occupied the
field and all state tort claims alleging unsafe design defects were
preempted. The courts uniformly rejected the type 1 preemption
argument, citing section 1397(c).
For example, in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 33 the plaintiff
alleged a safety defect in the design of the car's steering system.
The manufacturer contended in defense that "any safety standards
in design and equipment should be imposed as envisioned by the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 .... "134
No FMVSS governed the steering assembly, so this contention was
an argument for exclusive, type 1 preemption. The court held that
section 1397(c) "expressly negatives any intention of Congress to
acquire exclusive jurisdiction in this field and leaves the common law
liability intact."'
13 5
After a six year lull, in no less than six cases from 1974 to 1976,
defendants asserted the type 1 preemption argument, which was
uniformly rebuffed. 136 In Arbet v. Gussarson,137 for example, the
plaintiff alleged defective design of the gas tank. Again there ex-
isted no FMVSS on the subject of gas tank design. The manufac-
turer argued that despite this lack of federal regulation, Congress
had occupied the field through type 1 preemption:
Finally, defendant argues that the national character of the auto-
mobile industry dictates that automobile design not be subject
to piecemeal regulation by different juries in different states.
Defendant argues that the problem of designing safe cars is for
the Congress, not state courts, and that federal safety regula-
tions established by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration, pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966, preempt the field of automobile safety regu-
132 S. REP. No. 1301, supra note 86, at 2720.
133 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
134 Id. at 506 (citation omitted).
135 Id. (emphasis added).
136 See, e.g., Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993,999-1000 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Anton
v. Ford Motor Co., 400 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975); McMullen v. Volkswagen of
America, 274 Or. 83, 87-89, 545 P.2d 117, 119-20 (1976); Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d
551, 562, 225 N.W.2d 431, 438 (1975); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497,
505-06 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 216-19,
321 A.2d 737, 745-46 (1974).
137 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975).
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lation thus rendering state courts powerless to act in this
area. 138
The court rejected this type 1 preemption argument on the basis of
section 1397(c). Furthermore, no issue of the type 2 preemption
embodied in section 1392(d) was presented, since no FMVSS ex-
isted regulating the same aspect of performance as the claimed
defect.
A more subtle type 1 preemption argument appeared in two
more recent cases. Rather than arguing that Congress had occu-
pied the field and deprived the state courts of all power to set safety
standards through tort doctrine, these defendants, emphasizing the
broad range of FMVSS they had complied with, argued that such
compliance constituted a defense to the tort claim for defective de-
sign. This argument is more properly seen as one of tort doctrine,
that compliance with government regulations constitutes due care
in design as a matter of law. 139 To the extent it is seen as a preemp-
tion argument, however, it is important to note that since no
FMVSS was on-point with respect to the alleged defect, the argu-
ment must assert type 1 preemption. Thus, the type 1 preemption
argument in these cases asserts that by promulgating a series of
regulations, NHTSA has occupied the field and impliedly said that
no other design standards are necessary for a vehicle to be safely
designed. In effect, the defendants were arguing that they com-
plied with all FMVSS, and that no other safety requirements could
be placed on the design of a vehicle.
In the first of these cases, Dawson v. Chrysler Corp.,140 the alleged
defect was the failure to design reinforcing members in the frame in
order to prevent deformation and intrusion into the vehicle in a
side impact. While regulations governed crashworthiness through
occupant restraint requirements in FMVSS 208 and side door
strength in FMVSS 214, no FMVSS directly governed vehicle frame
strength or rigidity, the defect alleged.141 Chrysler's argument that
compliance with standards 208 and 214, as well as all the other
FMVSS, should relieve it from liability for inadequate frame
strength, ungoverned by federal regulation, was rejected. The
court ruled that where no federal regulation governed the defect,
the preemptive effect of section 1392(d) did not apply, and there-
fore, section 1397(c) negated the type I preemption argument ad-
vanced by Chrysler. 142
138 Id. at 562, 225 N.W.2d at 438 (footnote omitted).
139 See text accompanying notes 172-77 infra.
140 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980).
141 Petition for Certiorari at 12, Chrysler Corp. v. Dawson, 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
142 630 F.2d at 957-58.
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In Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 43 the alleged defect was an
A-pillar which deformed inward in a front end collision. Honda de-
fended by alleging that its compliance with FMVSS governing seat
assemblies, seatbelt assemblies, fuel tank integrity, and displace-
ment of the steering column should preclude an award of punitive
damages based on its marketing a car with an A-pillar defect which
they knew to exist.144 The court noted with some emphasis that
none of the regulations with which Honda complied governed the
strength of the A-pillar, and went on to hold that compliance with
these unrelated regulations would not provide a defense to the A-
pillar claim.
45
Thus, section 1397(c) has frequently been used to reject claims
of type 1 preemption and, in this respect, state tort law has been
saved from preemption. The savings clause has never been ap-
plied, however, in a type 2 preemption situation, where an on-point
FMVSS governed the same aspect of performance as the alleged
defect, and the alleged defect was based on a state tort standard not
identical to the federal standard.
146
Conflict analysis reconciliation of section 1392(d) and section
1397(c) gives effect to the policies of the preemption clause, while
allowing the savings clause to serve its traditional function of de-
feating an argument for type 1 preemption, rather than destroying
the act of which it is a part. Under this conflict analysis, "no
airbag" tort claims would be preempted. FMVSS 208, governing
occupant crash protection and "specifying equipment requirements
for active and passive restraint systems,"' 147 clearly governs the
same aspect of performance as such a tort claim. The federal stan-
dard allows the manufacturer to install its choice of different re-
straint devices. The state tort standard would require installation
of airbags rather than manual seatbelts. The two standards are,
therefore, not identical, and allowance of the state tort claim would
violate section 1392(d).
The savings clause cannot save this claim under the conflict
analysis. A tort standard requiring airbags would conflict with sev-
eral policies of the Act. First, by its nature as a standard different
from the federal standard, it would defeat the strong policy for uni-
143 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981).
144 Id. at 653-57 (footnote omitted).
145 Id. at 657.
146 For the few cases where the claimed defect was governed by a FMVSS other than
those where the claim was that the vehicle failed to meet the standard, the courts have
discussed the effect of compliance with government regulations on the issue of negligence
as a matter of tort doctrine. However, the courts have not discussed the preemption ques-
tion of whether the state standard may be different from the federal regulation under
§ 1392(d). See text accompanying notes 172-77 infra.
147 49 C.F.R. § 571.208(S2) (1984).
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formity of standards.1 48 Second, the NHTSA decision not to re-
quire airbags, but rather to give manufacturers the option to meet
the requirement in different ways, serves two specific policy objec-
tives that would be defeated by a state tort standard mandating in-
stallation of airbags to avoid liability. The decision not to mandate
immediate installation has been NHTSA's consistent response to a
continuing concern about the safety of current airbag technol-
ogy.' 49 Moreover, NHTSA's decision to allow a choice of compli-
ance methods was designed to encourage manufacturers to develop
new and more effective restraint technologies rather than locking
them in to a single device.150 Therefore, state tort law which allows
liability to be assessed for failure to install airbags is not identical to
and conflicts with FMVSS 208, and thus should be preempted.
IV. Reciprocal Comity in "No Airbag" Tort Claims
A. The Doctrine of Comity
The United States Constitution created a system of govern-
ment in which the sovereign states granted to a federal government
power over certain enumerated aspects of national governmental
interest, while retaining power over all other aspects for them-
selves. Thus the states assigned power to legislate with regard to
interstate commerce to the federal government,' 5 1 while retaining
the power to legislate to safeguard the health and safety of its citi-
zens. State laws regulating safety, of course, may be applied to and
may affect interstate commerce, 152 and federal regulation of inter-
state commerce may include regulation of local activity to protect
the health and safety of state citizens. 15 3
When both governments, under their separate powers, have
regulated the same thing, the federal regulation preempts the state
regulation under the supremacy clause. 54 This article earlier sug-
gested that the federal government has regulated the question of
whether to require airbags in motor vehicles, preempting any state
regulation through its product liability law. Even if there were no
preemption, however, principles of comity and federalism dictate
that the state should exercise restraint in establishing safety stan-
148 See text accompanying notes 99-107 supra.
149 See text accompanying notes 26-32 supra. See also 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962, 28,999-29,001
(1984); 42 Fed. Reg. 61,466 (1977); Pacific Leg. Found. v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d
1338 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
150 See 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962, 29,001 (1984).
151 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
152 See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
154 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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dards through its product liability law so as not to interfere with the
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme.
The constitutional division of power between state and federal
governments continues to hold substantial force, even if it is not
compulsive, preemptive force. The assignment of overlapping
powers to separate sovereignties has the potential to generate fric-
tion between them. For this reason, both state and federal govern-
ments have been cautioned to use restraint in the exercise of their
respective powers when operating in areas that the other sovereign
has regulated as well. This is the meaning of comity.
The federal judicial system has frequently restrained its exer-
cise of power to prevent interference with the states' exercise of
their important judicial and administrative functions, and to pro-
mote harmonious relations with the states.1 55 The state judiciary
should reciprocally honor these federalism principles by insuring
that its decisions do not unduly interfere with legitimate federal ju-
dicial and administrative functions, though the state might, as a
matter of raw power, be authorized to do so. Comity is a joint en-
terprise. Cooperation between state and federal government and
respect by one government for the legitimate interests of the other
are crucial to insuring the smooth operation of a federalist
republic. 156
The areas in which federal courts refrain from exercising their
155 In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), for example, the Supreme Court held that
a federal court should not ordinarily enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding. Though it
expressed no doubt about the constitutional power of the federal courts to act, the Court
cautioned that they should refrain from acting, in deference to the states. Moreover, the
Court made it clear that the restraints of comity were an obligation of both the state and
national governments:
The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it
means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Govern-
ment and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept
does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Government, and in which the National Government, anx-
ious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests,
always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States.
Id. at 44.
156 As Judge McGowan writes, federalism must be mutual:
Federalism means many things to many people. In its broadest common meaning,
however, it refers to the relations between the states and the general government
under our political system. These relations have involved a dual aspect. First,
Federalism has meant the desirability and necessity of the general government de-
ferring to the states in order to allow them their proper role over issues of state
and local concern. But the other side of federalism is the desirability and necessity
of the state governments deferring to the general government in issues of national
concern.
McGowan, Federalism-Old and New--and the Federal Courts, 70 GEO. L.J. 1421, 1431 (1982).
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power in deference to the states are many and varied.' 57 Of partic-
ular relevance to the "no airbag" tort claim and the federal regula-
tory scheme is a branch of abstention doctrine known as Burford
abstention.15 8 In Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 159 the Supreme Court, citing
"a sound respect for the independence of state action," required
the federal courts to refrain from reviewing the reasonableness of
issuing a drilling permit because such review would interfere with a
state regulatory scheme for the control of oil and gas drilling.'
60
The Burford doctrine has subsequently been described by the
Supreme Court as preventing interference with state administrative
agencies.' 6' The thrust of the doctrine is to avoid federal interfer-
ence with areas of strong state concern, where the state has taken
administrative steps to regulate the area.'
62
In many situations, therefore, the federal courts have refused
to exercise their power in order to avoid friction with state func-
tions, or have acted in ways designed to promote harmonious rela-
tions with the state authority. Such deference and restraint is
necessary in our constitutional structure in which separate sover-
eigns may act upon the same issue, albeit with separate sources of
power. Such deference should not be expected of the federal sov-
ereign alone. State judiciaries should take equal responsibility for
insuring that their decisions do not interfere with legitimate federal
concerns, and should reciprocate the deference that the federal
courts have shown them. If necessary to avoid conflict with federal
concerns, state courts should sometimes refuse to act even though
they might possess the raw power to do so; and when they do act,
state courts should do so in a way which minimizes the potential for
conflict with legitimate federal interests. 163
157 The Younger doctrine, see note 155 supra, for example, has been greatly expanded to
include strictures against federal injunctions, declaratory judgments, and even actions at
law for damages where federal rulings would interfere with state criminal proceedings or
state civil or administrative proceedings. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION §§ 4252-4254 (1978 & Supp. 1985). Cf. Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (state prisoner
may not seek federal habeas corpus relief when the state has provided a full and fair oppor-
tunity to be heard); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (mandating restraint where a
federal judge interfered with the operations of a city police department); Railroad Comm'n
of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (ordering federal district court to refrain from
interpreting and determining the constitutionality of an unsettled question of state law).
158 See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 157, § 4244.
159 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
160 Id. at 334.
161 See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959).
162 See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814
(1976) (abstention required when ruling "would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern."). See also C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 310-11 (4th ed. 1983).
163 Though some of these suits may be heard in federal court based on diversity of citi-
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In particular, principles of comity urge state courts to act in a
way which does not interfere with a federal regulatory scheme. The
federal courts, in Burford abstention, refrain from disrupting a state
administrative scheme and state efforts to "establish a coherent pol-
icy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern." 164 Simi-
larly, state courts should structure their decisions in a way which
does not disrupt a federal administrative scheme designed to estab-
lish a coherent policy on a matter of public concern.
B. The Federal Interest in Vehicle Safety Standards
Congress created NHTSA for the express purpose of setting
uniform national motor vehicle safety standards as a matter of
strong federal policy and public concern. The establishment of
uniform national safety standards for motor vehicles is a matter
most appropriate for federal action.165 Uniformity of the standards
is crucial for the motor vehicle manufacturing industry as well as for
the safety of the public. NHTSA is charged to consider a variety of
factors in setting safety standards, including the practicability of the
design in the real world, the effect of the design on other federal
policies such as fuel economy, and the effect of the design on the
safety of the entire national fleet of cars, so that one car is not made
safer at the expense of the safety of many other cars.
1 66
Setting motor vehicle safety standards through state product
liability law would be both bad policy and disruptive of the federal
administrative scheme. Individual juries are not able to adequately
judge the variety of technological factors which must be considered
in establishing a safe design. In product liability cases, however,
juries are asked to perform the same balancing of factors that
NHTSA must perform in establishing a FMVSS. 167 Congress has
specifically found that expertise is necessary to perform this balance
in a way which is fair to manufacturers and consumers alike. 16
8
Even the best trial cannot present a jury with the range of in-
formation available to NHTSA. Moreover, a jury inherently lacks
the expertise of NHTSA in evaluating that information. Yet juries
zenship jurisdiction, the federal courts must apply state substantive law and sit functionally
as state courts in such circumstances under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938). State law interference with the federal administrative scheme, regardless of
whether the court enforcing that law is a federal or a state court, offends the principles of
comity.
164 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
165 See Reed & Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case for Federal Action, 63 NEB. L.
REV. 389 (1984).
166 See 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f) (1982).
167 Compare tort standards in Note, supra note 58, at 815-17 with regulatory standards in
15 U.S.C. § 1392(f) (1982).
168 See 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2709, 2712.
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would be asked, in effect, to second guess NHTSA's determination
whenever there exists an on-point FMVSS. In addition, juries are
likely to focus on the vehicle involved in their particular case, dis-
counting the effect of their decision on other vehicles on the road,
and different juries are likely to enforce inconsistent standards. For
these reasons, courts 69 and commentators 170 have criticized prod-
uct liability rules which allow juries to set design standards on an
atomized case-by-case basis.
Allowing juries to set a safety standard requiring airbags in mo-
tor vehicles would render NHTSA's long hours of work in setting a
passenger restraint standard meaningless. Manufacturers would be
required, under threat of damages, to install airbags despite
NHTSA's decision not to require their installation at this time and
to press instead for mandatory seatbelt use laws. Principles of com-
ity dictate that state courts must act in a way to avoid this friction
between state courts and the federal administrative scheme. State
courts should defer to NHTSA and hold that where the federal ad-
ministrative agency has promulgated a standard directed at the al-
leged defect, the FMVSS has set the standard for liability under
state law as well.' 71
C. State Tort Law and Federal Regulatory Standards
Interpreting state tort standards so as to give proper deference
to federal regulations, particularly with regard to passenger re-
straint, is logical and consistent with the generally accepted stan-
dards for defining a defective product. Whether a state employs
the "consumer expectation" test or the "risk-utility" analysis,
FMVSS 208 should set the standard for liability. As a general rule,
when a FMVSS is on point, a consumer should not legally be enti-
tled to expect more from a vehicle. With the extensive publicity the
airbag question has generated and the obvious presence of
seatbelts and absence .of airbags in a vehicle, such an expectation
169 See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980) (allowing juries to
establish national automobile safety standards results in incoherent standards and the po-
tential for conflict with other policies); McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.
W.Va. 1971) (automobile design standards are properly developed by the legislature, not
the courts); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74, 80-81, 268 N.W.2d 291, 294
(1978) (design standards should not be developed through adjudication because of lack of
expertise ofjury and influence of sympathy for injured plaintiff); General Motors Corp. v.
Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812 (rex. Civ. App. 1978) (regulatory standards should be developed
by experts, not the courts).
170 See, e.g., HendersonJudicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits
of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973); Hoenig, supra note 77, at 711-13, 724.
171 See, e.g., Hurt v. General Motors Corp., 553 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1977) (compliance
with an on-point FMVSS on seatbelt angle entitled a manufacturer to a directed verdict of
non-liability as a matter of state tort law).
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would be even more unreasonable. This common sense interpreta-
tion of the consumer expectation standard for safety design defects
would satisfy the concerns of federalism and comity by supporting
rather than undermining the federal regulatory scheme.
Using the risk-utility analysis, the court must balance the safety
aspects of the design against other factors in precisely the same way
as NHTSA does when promulgating a FMVSS. The difference,
however, is that courts must perform this balancing in the context
of a trial, while NHTSA has substantially more time, resources, and
expertise to do the job. After manufacturers as well as others have
presented evidence to NHTSA concerning the risk and utility of
safety design features, and after NHTSA has struck the balance and
authorized the design, it would then be unreasonable, inefficient,
and unjust to require the manufacturer to defend that same design
over and over in courts throughout the country with the continuous
risk of inconsistent adjudications. The fair way to interpret the risk-
utility analysis, particularly with regard to airbags, would be to hold
as a matter of state law that the balance struck by NHTSA is the
correct balance and sets the standard for state tort liability. This
interpretation again supports rather than undercuts the federal reg-
ulatory scheme as comity principles demand.
Finally, interpreting state tort law to incorporate an on-point
FMVSS as its liability standard is consistent with most commenta-
tors' view of the tort defense of compliance with a statute or gov-
ernmental regulation. As Dean Prosser states the rule:
Where there is a normal situation, clearly identical with that
contemplated by the statute or regulation, and no special cir-
cumstances or danger are involved, it may be found, and can be
ruled as a matter of law, that the actor has done his full duty by
complying with the statute, and nothing more is required ....
But if there are unusual circumstances, or increased danger be-
yond the minimum which the statute was designed to meet, it
may be found that there is negligence in not doing more.172
Many states, however, generally hold that governmental regu-
lations are evidence of an appropriate standard of design, but are
not controlling. These states fail to adequately distinguish among
the various situations where governmental standards may be rele-
vant to a design defect claim. When the governmental standard ap-
172 W. PROSSER, supra note 50, at 203-04 (citation omitted). Prosser uses this example:
Thus the requirement of a hand signal on a left turn does not mean that the legis-
lature has conferred immunity upon a driver who is otherwise negligent in making
the turn, and that he is absolved from all obligation to slow down, keep a proper
lookout, and proceed with reasonable care.
Id. Presumably, however, a driver who gives a proper hand signal would be provided by
this statute with a defense to a claim that he should have signaled the turn not with his hand
but with a light.
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plies to a similar product, or to a later model of the product, for
example, then it may be relevant to the proper standard of care,
though not controlling. 173 This is because the regulation does not
apply to the product by operation of law, but only by analogy. In
the same vein, when a regulation applies to a certain part of a prod-
uct, but does not consider the particular defect alleged in that part,
the regulation may not control the standard of care. 174 Finally,
when the government standard is outdated, then perhaps it should
not be dispositive of the current duty of care.
175
When the federal regulation is on point, applies to the subject
vehicle, considers the same problem that a suit asks the jury to con-
sider, and is up to date, however, justice requires that the manufac-
turer be entitled to rely on that standard as establishing the duty of
care. 176 This is particularly true when the regulation has approved
specific alternative safety devices, and the plaintiff's claim is that the
approved device chosen by the manufacturer is legally inadequate
under the law of torts. 177 FMVSS 208, which over its history has
173 See, e.g., Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1517 (6th Cir. 1983) (roof
crush standard, not applicable to subject vehicle which predated standard, admissible in
evidence but not controlling on question of liability); Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp.,
587 F.2d 151, 157 (4th Cir. 1978) (same); General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d
812, 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (same), rev'don other grounds, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979);
Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 846 (3d Cir.) (window retention standard,
not applicable to subject vehicle, relevant but not controlling), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867
(1981); Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 540, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609
(1976) (head restraint standard, not applicable to subject vehicle, relevant but not
controlling).
174 See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.J. 1975) (where federal headrest
standard concerned injury to neck from rearward movement of head rather than nature of
impact of head on headrest, suit for insufficient padding on headrest not governed by
FMVSS requiring headrest).
175 Congress has charged NHTSA to engage in frequent updating of FMVSS in light of
developments in automotive technology. See S. REP. No. 1301, supra note 86, at 2713
("[A]t least once every 2 years. . . the Secretary is directed to issue new and revised stan-
dards."). Certainly FMVSS 208 governing passenger restraint has been reviewed fre-
quently. See text accompanying notes 22-36 supra.
176 See Johnson, Products Liability "Reform" A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.L. REv. 677,
688 (1978) ("If a court finds that a governmental standard is rigorous, up-to-date and di-
rectly addresses the defect alleged, compliance with that standard should be dispositive of
the manufacturer's due care."); Werber, The Products Liability Revolution-Proposals for Contin-
ued Legislative Response in the Automotive Industry, 18 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1982)
("Where an agency has carefully considered all aspects of the safety issue, as does the Na-
tional Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and has the capacity and will-
ingness to make independent tests and obtain independent studies,. . . compliance [with
that agency's regulation] . . . should sometimes bar a plaintiff from recovery."). See, e.g.,
Hurt v. General Motors Corp., 553 F.2d 1181, 1184 (8th Cir. 1977) (compliance with
FMVSS governing seatbelt angle satisfied tort duty of care despite claim that seatbelt angle
was defectively dangerous). But see Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 86, 583 P.2d 305, 308
(1978) (compliance with dashboard rigidity standard did not necessarily satisfy state tort
duty of care).
177 See, e.g., Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267, 273
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been frequently reviewed and which was recently amended after ex-
haustive consideration of the benefits and drawbacks of airbags,
and which specifically approved manual seatbelts, is just such a
standard. The principles of reciprocal comity dictate that state
courts should give proper deference to the federal policies impli-
cated in that regulation and to the expertise of NHTSA, and should
hold that compliance with that standard satisfies the state tort law
duty of care.
V. Conclusion
NHTSA's latest decision on passenger restraints has generated
increased publicity about airbags. As state legislatures debate
mandatory seatbelt use laws, the alternative-airbags or other pas-
sive restraints-is also spotlighted. Unfortunately, much of this
publicity is incomplete and overly optimistic about the benefits of
airbags. 178 NHTSA's verdict on airbags is that they have a few
problems: they are costly, of limited effectiveness, of questionable
reliability, and would require several years before they could be in-
stalled in a substantial number of cars in use. NHTSA has never
required installation of airbags, but has always, for specific policy
reasons, allowed manufacturers the option of satisfying the passen-
ger restraint standard with manual seatbelts.
As a result of the recent airbag publicity, however, and as a
result of a concerted campaign to move the airbag question out of
the federal regulatory agency and into the courtroom, state tort
suits alleging failure to equip a car with airbags have become in-
creasingly common. Many state courts will eventually be forced to
rule on the validity of such a claim, and on the question of what
effect federal regulation of airbags and passenger restraint should
have on the state law tort claim.
Whatever the merits of the airbag debate may be, it is plain that
the better forum for resolving the debate is the NHTSA. NHTSA
has conducted its own independent tests and studies of airbags, and
has the expertise and national perspective to evaluate its own data,
the information of others, and the merits of the various arguments
in a fair and impartial manner. An inexperienced jury should not
be allowed to second guess NHTSA's decision in the context of a
trial, because of its limited resources and the necessarily emotion-
(1977) (where power press manufacturer used one of ten safety devices approved by State
Industrial Commission, court held this satisfied state tort duty of care as matter of law).
178 See, e.g., Barrett, The Mandatory Seat-Belt Ploy, Boston Globe, Feb. 27, 1985, at 15, col.
2 (airbags superior to seatbelts in frontal collisions); Chandler, Airbags-Life-Saving and Un-
available, Boston Globe, Mar. 11, 1985, at 41, col. 2 (using outdated NHTSA estimate that
airbags would save four times more lives than universal use of seatbelts rather than current
estimate that 70% seatbelt usage would save more lives than universal airbag installation).
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ally charged atmosphere which surrounds a claim for damages by a
severely injured plaintiff.
Dissatisfied with the federal lawmakers' decision, airbag advo-
cates have sought effective reversal of that decision through state
tort law. It is precisely this use of state law to frustrate federal pol-
icy that the doctrine of preemption is designed to prevent. It is just
this sort of friction between state and federal governments that the
doctrine of comity seeks to avoid. Whether the ruling is phrased in
terms of a contrary state standard being preempted, or in terms of
the state tort standard being conformed to the federal standard ac-
cording to comity principles, state courts should hold that FMVSS
208 sets the standard for passenger restraint, and therefore a tort
claim for absence of airbags from a vehicle is not actionable as a
matter of law.
